Introduction
With rare exceptions, spatial models of candidate strategies under the plurality voting system have analyzed single-stage plurality elections, i.e. elections in which the winning candidate is the one who receives the most votes in a single round of voting.
1 Among advanced industrial societies, France is a notable example of a country that features a twostage plurality process for selecting representatives to its national legislature (The National Assembly) as well as to the presidency. 2 In this paper we explore the following question, in the context of the 1988 French Presidential election: Does the two-stage process for electing the French president change the policy strategies that competitive, office-seeking candidates would plausibly pursue, compared with the strategies they would pursue if the winning candidate were selected in a single-stage plurality process?
In this paper, we argue that the surprising answer to the above question is no. Specifically, we report analyses of survey data drawn from the 1988 French presidential election, which provides estimates of the electoral impacts of the candidates' policy proposals.
We then elaborate a simple way that the competitive presidential candidates in this election -the Socialist Francois Mitterrand, the Gaullist Jacques Chirac, and the UDF candidate Raymond Barre -might have used our computations in formulating their policy strategies.
This approach takes as its starting point our survey data analyses, in which we compute each candidate's expected vote share -in both the first round and second rounds of voting -as a function of the candidate's Left-Right position. This approach also allows us to ana- 1 We note, however, that there are additional spatial modeling studies that analyze two-stage plurality systems from a social choice perspective (see, e.g., Merrill, 1988) . However this research is not primarily concerned with candidates' policy strategies but instead with evaluating the efficiency or desirability of twostage plurality systems (relative to other voting systems), i.e. the extent to which alternative voting systems satisfy normative desirata such as selecting the Condorcet candidate (which is the candidate who is majoritypreferred to all rival candidates in a series of pairwise comparisons).
2 As discussed below, in French presidential elections the two top finishers in the first round advance to a runoff election held two weeks later. In district-level elections to the National Assembly, by contrast, all
candidates who win at least 12.5% of the first-round vote are eligible to advance to the runoff election. For an interesting study of how the two-stage process affects parliamentary candidates' strategies in France, see Tsebelis (1990, chapter 7) .
lyze counterfactual scenarios in which the winner was selected in a one-stage plurality process.
Our analysis leads us to the following conclusion: This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the 1988 French presidential election, both in terms of the actual two-stage contest that took place, and in terms of how the election might have unfolded had the winner been determined in a single stage. In Section 3 we analyze survey data from this election, and we use these analyses to compute the effects of candidate positioning upon their expected vote shares. Section 4 presents our computations on the competitive candidates' equilibrium positions, for alternative onestage and two-stage election scenarios. Section 5 concludes.
Counterfactual Simulations and the 1988 French Presidential Election

The context of the election
French presidential elections feature two stages, with the two top finishers in the first round of voting advancing to a runoff election held two weeks later, and the winner determined by direct popular vote. 
Office-seeking strategies
Candidate strategies for the actual two-stage election. In an earlier paper on the 1988
French presidential election (Adams and Merrill, 2000) , we analyzed the candidates' policy strategies using the assumption that all five of the major party candidates selected their policy programmes with an eye towards maximizing their first-round vote. Here, in exploring the candidates' office-seeking strategies for the two-stage selection process, we modify this assumption to account for two factors: first, that the competitive candidates were plausibly concerned with both rounds of voting; second, that not all of the candidates in the 1988 election were competitive, and that these noncompetitive candidates plausibly selected their policy positions based on alternative criteria. With respect to this latter point, we note that Lajoinie and Le Pen, the nominees of the small, extremist Communist and National Front parties, had no realistic chance of being elected, regardless of the policy positions they presented. 4 We shall therefore confine our exploration of office-seeking motivations to Mitterrand, Barre, and Chirac, the three competitive candidates, while as- With respect to Mitterrand, Barre, and Chirac, the analysis of these competitive candidates' office-seeking strategies revolves around how they plausibly weighted electoral support in the first round of voting against support at the decisive second ballot. To begin with, we assume that these candidates were constrained to present a single, consistent set of policy positions over the two rounds of voting -an assumption that appears reasonable given that these two stages were separated by only two weeks, so that any attempt by a candidate to dramatically alter his policy image between the first and second rounds would likely expose him to charges of flip-flopping and political opportunism. In the case of Mitterrand, who was expected to advance easily to the second round -an expectation that proved well-founded, as Mitterrand polled nearly twice as many first-round votes as his nearest competitor (see Table 1 ) -it appears plausible that Mitterrand weighted secondround support more heavily than support in the first round. The cases of Barre and Chirac are more complicated. These two candidates were locked in a close contest for the runnerup spot at round one, so that they surely weighted their first-round support heavily, relative to their electoral support at round two (should they qualify for the runoff). More specifically, Barre and Chirac's calculations relative to the first ballot plausibly revolved around their expected vote margins relative to each other -rather than simply maximizing their number of voters who identified with the National Front, and the refusal of the mainstream right-wing parties to form an electoral alliance with the National Front.
5 Adams, Clark, Ezrow, and Glasgow (2004) 
where EV 1 (M) = Mitterrand's expected first-round vote.
EV 2 (M C ) = Mitterrand's expected second-round vote, assuming his opponent is Chirac.
EV 1 (B) = Barre's expected first-round vote.
EV 2 (B M ) = Barre's expected second-round vote, assuming his opponent is Mitterrand.
EV 1 (C) = Chirac's expected first-round vote.
EV 2 (C M ) = Chirac's expected second-round vote, assuming his opponent is Mitterrand.
Below we explore the candidates' strategies, as delineated in equations 1-3, for alternative values of the weighting parameter w 1 , which represents the emphasis the candidates' placed upon their first-round votes relative to the second round. 7 Intuitively it appears plausible that Barre and Chirac placed greater emphasis upon the first-round vote than did Mitterrand, given that the latter was virtually assured of advancing to the second round. Alternative simulations in which we varied the weights that different candidates attached to the first and second rounds supported substantive conclusions that were similar to the ones we report below.
8 We also considered exploring candidate positioning under the assumption that candidates maximized their subjective probabilities of being elected, i.e. that they maximized their subjective joint probabilities that they would advance to -and subsequently win -the runoff election. Duverger, 1954) . Indeed, we note that the strategy of coalescing behind a single candidate at the decisive ballot is already in operation under the current two-ballot system for parliamentary elections, for which the four mainstream political parties form pre-election electoral pacts such that the Communist-Socialist bloc and the UDF-RPR bloc agree in advance to present a single left-wing (right-wing) candidate at the second round of voting.
10
While acknowledging that we cannot foresee how the counterfactual scenario involving a one-round presidential election would have unfolded, the existence of the parliamentary electoral alliances described above provides some basis for prediction. We therefore employ the following assumption about how the 1988 French presidential election would have unfolded, had it been a one-round plurality election:
forces us to make strong (and unverifiable) assumptions about the candidates' beliefs about the uncertainty associated with each round of voting, and also about how the probabilities at each round were related to each other. For a study of these issues in one-round elections see Chapter 12 in Adams, Merrill, and Grofman, 2005. 9 We thank an anonymous referee for stressing this point to us. 10 We note that in the parliamentary elections of 1997 the UDF and RPR's electoral strategy involved running a single "unity" candidate at the first round in many districts, in order to avoid splitting the first-round vote so that this candidate would be sure of advancing to the second round. This strategy was motivated by the increased support for the far right National Front, which threatened to siphon off significant support from the center-right parties (see Givens, 2004) .
Assumption 1 on one-round elections: Had the 1988 French presidential election been a one-round plurality contest, the two major left-wing parties (the Communists and the Socialists) and the two major right-wing parties (the UDF and the RPR) would have each
united behind a single candidate.
In the case of the left, it seems certain that their candidate of choice in a one-round election would have been Francois Mitterrand, for not only was he the incumbent President but his political support far exceeded that of the Communist party's candidate Andre Lajoinie (see Table 1 ):
Assumption 2 on one-round elections: In a one-round French presidential election contest,
Mitterrand would have been the single candidate fielded by the major left-wing parties.
The case of the major right-wing parties is less clear, since Chirac, the RPR's candidate, and Barre, the UDF's candidate, had approximately equal levels of support (see Table 1 ), so that it was unclear which of them would be a stronger representative for the mainstream right. Accordingly, we will explore two different scenarios, one in which the mainstream right united behind Barre, and another in which they united behind Chirac. Given the conflicting considerations discussed above, we will explore the candidates' office-seeking incentives for two alternative one-round scenarios, one in which Le
Pen was assumed to contest the election, and the other in which he did not. However, we will employ the simplifying assumption that in the event that Le Pen had contested a oneround plurality election, he would have presented the same policy positions that he was actually observed to present in the 1988 French presidential election. We believe this simplifying assumption is plausible, because the central factors that would have motivated Le
Pen's decision to contest a one-round election -the expressive motivation to articulate the National Front's extreme policy positions, and the desire to demonstrate the National 
Candidate Positioning and Voting Patterns in the 1988 French Presidential Election
In Pierce's 1988 French Presidential Election Survey, 1013 respondents were asked to place both themselves and the five major presidential candidates on four different sevenpoint scales: Left-Right, church schools, public sector, and immigration. The left-right scale runs from 1 (extreme left) to 7 (extreme right); on church schools, the scale is from 1 ('the state should not subsidize church schools') to 7 ('the state should increase subsidies for church schools'); on the public sector, the scale is from 1 ('supports a large public sector') to 7 ('the role of the state in the economy should be reduced'); the immigration scale runs from 1 ('we should integrate immigrants into French society) to 7 ('immigrants should return to their native country').
13 Table 2 shows the respondents' mean positions, as well as their mean candidate placements, for the subsample of 748 respondents who reported voting for one of the five major candidates on the first ballot, and who could place themselves on the left-right dimension. Note first that the French public appears centrist (on average) on each dimension, but that the candidates were perceived as taking quite divergent positions, with the Communist Lajoinie placed on the far left of each dimension, and Le Pen placed at the extreme right of the left-right and the immigration scales. Mitterrand was viewed as centerleft along each dimension, while Barre and Chirac were seen as center-right. These respondent placements accord well with experts' placements of the French parties' positions (see Huber and Inglehart, 1995, p.97) , thereby supporting Pierce's conclusion (1995, pp.
67-73) that French voters had sharply edged perceptions of the candidates' policy images.
12 That is, we assumed that Mitterrand sought to maximize the difference between his expected vote and Barre's expected vote, while Barre similarly sought to maximize the difference between his expected vote and Mitterrand's expected vote.
13 Note that we have reversed the endpoints of the three policy scales so that the most left-wing response is 1 and the most right-wing response 7. In addition, the survey did not record respondents' placements of Lajoinie on the three policy scales, so we report instead their placements of the Communist party.
[ Merrill, 1999, 2000; Nagler, 1995, 1998; Schofield et al., 1998; Schofield and Sened, 2004) .
costless spatial mobility, this conclusion would certainly hold if we specified a penalty for dramatic policy shifts. In this spirit we proceed. [
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Candidate equilibria in two-round versions of the French presidential election
Although the policy optima presented in Figure 1 are suggestive, note, first, that these optima are based entirely on the first round of voting, and, second, that each candidate's first-round optimum was computed using the assumption that all rival candidates were located at their actual (perceived) positions. The former assumption ignores the fact that the candidates plausibly weighed the impacts of their policy strategies upon both their first-and their second round votes, as delineated in the candidate utility functions represented by equations 1-3 in Section 2. The latter assumption is problematic because the candidates could be expected to react to each other, so that they might eventually converge to a Nash equilibrium, i.e. a configuration of policy strategies such that no candidate would have an incentive to shift his position, given the positioning of the rival candidates.
Accordingly, we computed the equilibrium positions for the competitive candidates Mitterrand, Barre, and Chirac, using the algorithm presented in Merrill and Adams (2001) .
As discussed in Section 2, for these computations we fixed the noncompetitive candidates Le Pen and Lajoinie at their actual (perceived) positions, i.e. we assumed that these candidates did not react to their competitors' policy strategies, but instead articulated their sincere policy preferences. We computed the competitive candidates' Left-Right equilibrium positions while fixing all of the candidates at their actual (perceived) positions along the policy scales for immigration, church schools, and the public sector.
17 Table 3 reports the candidates' Nash equilibrium positions, for alternative assump- Chirac (see Table 3 ) However for more realistic scenarios in which the candidates emphasized both rounds of voting (i.e., when w 1 was set at a value between zero and one), the candidates' equilibrium positions are all relatively centrist. For instance, for the scenario in which the candidates attached equal weights to the first and second rounds of the election (w 1 =0.5), the equilibrium configuration locates Mitterrand at 3.37, Barre at 4.27, and Chirac at 4.47. Finally, we find that had the candidates been completely concerned with the runoff election (w 1 =0), they would have had incentives to converge to identical, centrist positions along the Left-Right scale. This result is consistent with previous spatial 16 Barre's expected margin versus Chirac equals the difference between Barre's expected vote and Chirac's expected vote, while Chirac's expected margin versus Barre is similarly defined. 17 We performed additional computations, which located a Nash equilibrium for the competitive candidates along the three policy scales (in addition to the Left-Right scale). The candidates' Left-Right equilibrium positions for this four-dimensional equilibrium were similar to the one-dimensional equilibrium configurations that we report below. studies of two-candidate competition for a voting model based on the behavioralists' multivariate specification (see Erikson and Romero, 1990 ).
18
Our finding, that the candidates would have incentives to moderate when they considered the effects of their policies upon their prospects in the two-candidate runoff election, is driven by the Downsian logic that two-candidate elections motivate policy moderation from office-seeking candidates. In the case of our simulations on the 1988 French presidential election data we find that this centripetal incentive is sufficiently strong that, the centrifugal incentives relating to the first round of voting notwithstanding, this twostage election process would motivate relatively centrist strategies by office-seeking candidates.
[ 
Candidate equilibria for one-round versions of the presidential election
Next, we analyzed the candidates' policy motivations for the four one-round election scenarios delineated in Section 2. These include: a three-candidate scenario involving Mitterrand, Barre, and Le Pen; a three-candidate scenario involving Mitterrand, Chirac, and Le Pen; a two-candidate contest between Mitterrand and Barre; a two-candidate contest involving Mitterrand and Chirac. As discussed in Section 2, in our computations we assumed that, had Le Pen contested a one-round version of the election, he would have presented the same policy positions that he actually advocated in the 1988 two-stage presidential election. We also assumed that in a three-candidate election involving Le Pen, the two competitive candidates (i.e. Mitterrand and Barre/Chirac) would have each maximized his expected margin vis-à-vis the other competitive candidate contesting the race.
The candidates' computed equilibrium positions for alternative one-round scenarios are reported in Table 4 . We again find, as expected, that in the hypothetical one-round 18 We performed alternative computations in which we assumed that Mitterrand anticipated that his secondround opponent would be Barre, rather than Chirac. For this scenario, the computed equilibria were as follows (where M, B, and C represent the equilibrium positions for Mitterrand, Barre, and Chirac, respectively): The presence of Le Pen in the race would have given the two competitive candidates incentives to diverge moderately from each other, with the major right-wing candidate's optimal position shifting modestly to the right compared to the pure two-candidate scenario, and Mitterrand's optimal position shifting modestly to the left. 19 The degree of policy divergence between the major candidates' policy optima with Le Pen in the raceabout 0.6 policy units along the 1-7 Left-Right scale -is roughly comparable to what we estimated for the two-stage election scenarios, when the candidates were assumed to attach equal importance to both rounds of voting.
Conclusion
We have analyzed the policy incentives for office-seeking candidates in the 1988
French presidential election, both under the actual two-ballot plurality structure that was used to select the president, and for alternative one-ballot plurality scenarios. Our chief aim has been to estimate whether a shift to a one-ballot plurality process would have significantly changed the candidates' policy incentives. We find that to answer this question Mitterrand's motivation to shift further to the left when Le Pen enters the race is because Le Pen's entrance further reduces Mitterrand's likelihood of attracting right-wing support -since these voters now have two right-wing alternatives to choose from, at least one of whom is virtually certain to be preferable to Mitterrand -so that Mitterrand attaches less weight to these voters' policy preferences, compared with the pure twocandidate elections scenario. We note that these types of strategic calculations are explored in depth in Merrill and Adams (2002) .
Given that there are no obvious answers to the above questions, we have analyzed the policy incentives for the competitive candidates Mitterrand, Barre, and Chirac, for alternative sets of assumptions about how the candidates weighted electoral support in the first and second rounds of voting, and, for one-round elections, we have explored several alternative scenarios concerning the set of competing candidates. While we find that the candidate equilibria that we locate vary with the assumptions we employ, the central substantive finding that emerges from this exercise is that, to the extent that the candidates in a two-stage process attached at least moderate weight to the second round of voting -an assumption that strikes us as quite reasonable -both one-stage and two-stage plurality contests would provide the candidates with incentives to moderate their positions. Therefore we conclude that the competitive candidates' policy incentives in the 1988 French presidential elections would have been similar, regardless of whether the selection process was conducted using the actual two-stage plurality system or an alternative one-stage system.
We note that our conclusion comes with the following caveats. First, although we find that the two-stage plurality system provided centripetal incentives to the competitive candidates Mitterrand, Barre, and Chirac, this two-stage system also allowed the extremist candidates Le Pen and Lajoinie to contest the election. Thus in 1988 the two-stage system allowed the French electorate to choose between a wide variety of viewpoints in the first round of voting, at the same time that it provided incentives for policy moderation from the competitive candidates. Second, our conclusions rely on the assumption that voters' decision rules would have been the same had they voted in a one-stage election. Finally, we should be cautious about generalizing from the 1988 election to additional presidential elections.
The above candidate notwithstanding, our findings suggest that, in French presidential elections, competitive candidates' strategic policy incentives would not change significantly, were the presidential selection process changed to a one-stage plurality system.
Appendix 1. A Random Utility Voting Model for the First Round of the 1988 French Presidential Election
The model we estimate for the first round of voting in the 1988 French presidential election views the voter i's utility for a candidate K, U i (K), as a function of: V iK , the vector of i's utilities for K's policy and ideological positions; t i , the vector of i's individual characteristics; and a random disturbance term μ iK (whose distribution is given below):
where A and B represent vectors of parameters to be estimated.
With respect to the policy component V iK , we specify a mixed directionalproximity metric, which incorporates elements from Rabinowitz and Macdonald's (1989) directional theory of policy voting along with the standard proximity voting model. We specify voter i's utility for candidate K's position along issue j as:
where x ij represents the voter's position, x Kj her perception of K's position, and N j the neutral point along issue j for the directional model relative to both direction and intensity (see Rabinowitz and Macdonald, 1989) which we locate at 4 along each dimension, the midpoint of the 1-7 scale. The mixing parameter β, which is to be empirically estimated, indicates the relative importance of proximity and directional motivations. 20 When β = 0, the proximity term drops out and we have the case of pure directional voting. When β = 1, the directional component drops out and we have the standard proximity model. Values of β between zero and one indicate that the voter has both directional and proximity motiva- 20 The mixing parameter, β, has been used by Merrill and Grofman (1997) and Dow (1997) because of its ease of interpretation. With the factor 2 in the definition of utility, this equation implies that the indifference point between a pair of candidates moves linearly with β between its respective positions for the two pure models. Thus a value of β=0.5 specifies an indifference point halfway between the two pure models.
tions, in which case voters tend to prefer candidates who propose policies that are similar to, but more extreme than, the voters' own preferred policies (so that for instance centerleft voters may prefer distinctly left-wing candidates). 21 This taste for candidates who propose policies that are more extreme than the voters' own positions may arise either because voters prefer politicians who provide policy leadership on salient issues (Iversen, 1994) , or, alternatively, because voters discount the candidates' abilities to fully implement their policy promises if they are elected (see Grofman, 1985; Merrill and Grofman, 1999; Kedar, 2002; Lacy and Paolino, 2001 ). The mixed directional-proximity metric given in equation 5 has been empirically evaluated by Iversen (1994) , Grofman (1997, 1999) , and Merrill (1997, 1999) , each of whom conclude that this model explains voting behavior better than either pure model does by itself. Elsewhere (see Chapter 5 in Adams, Merrill, and Grofman, 2005) we provide further justifications -both substantive and statistical -for this model in the context of voting in the 1988 French presidential election. 22 Computation of model utilities was performed using respondents' mean candidate placements.
23 21 As discussed in footnote 20 above, the parameter β in equation 5 specifies the degree to which voters prefer candidates who propose policies that are more extreme than the voters' own beliefs. The value β=0.5, for instance, indicates that a voter who self-places at 5 along one of the 1-7 policy scales prefers a candidate located at 6 along the scale, while the value β=0.75 indicates that a voter who self-places at 5 prefers a candidate located at 5.33. 22 Substantively, Chapter 5 in Adams, Merrill, and Grofman (2005) presents arguments that French voters had reasons to discount the candidates' proposals in the run-up to the 1988 election, given the fact that Mitterrand -the incumbent president since 1981 -had reversed some of the key economic and social policies that had been implemented early in his first term, while Chirac -the incumbent premier since 1986 -had proved unable (or unwilling) to fully enact his conservative policy agenda, in part due to schisms within the right-wing majority in the National Assembly. Thus the political events of 1981-1988 provided grounds for French voters to infer that the winner of the 1988 presidential election would face difficulties in fully implementing his policy agenda. Given this situation, it would be rational for outcome-oriented voters to support candidates proposing policies more extreme than the voters' sincere policy preferences, since voters would project that eventual government policy outputs would be more moderate versions of the winning candidate's pre-election promises. This is actually a higher defection rate than that reported for the 1988 American presidential election, for which ANES data shows that only 14% of respondents reported crossing party lines (Erikson and Romero, 1990) . This supports the conclusion that partisanship should be viewed as an independent variable in the 1988 French election (see also LewisBeck and Chlarson, 2002 23 Kramer and Rattinger (1998 ), Merrill and Grofman (1997 ), Westholm (1999 ), and Dow (1997 have employed individual placements, while Rabinowitz and Macdonald and their co-authors use mean placement over all respondents. We performed alternative computations using voter-specific candidate placements, and found that these supported substantive conclusions that were identical to the ones we report below.
24 Two alternatives to the CL model are the Generalized Extreme Value Model (GEV) and Multinomial Probit (MNP), both of which relax the assumptions that the error terms are uncorrelated across candidates.
Elsewhere (Adams and Merrill, 1998) we compare the candidates' strategies in the first round of the 1988
French presidential election using parameter estimates derived from the CL and the GEV models, and we find that the candidates' computed vote-maximizing positions were quite similar across models.
expressed in terms of both voter-specific variables and variables that relate voters to candidates.
Parameter estimates for the CL vote model. We estimated the parameters of our vote model for the subsample of 748 of the 1,013 respondents interviewed in Pierce's 1988 French Presidential Election Study (1996 , who reported voting for one of the five major candidates at the first ballot, and who placed themselves and the five major candidates on the Left-Right scale. 25 In order to simplify the subsequent simulations on candidate movement, parameter estimates that were not statistically different from zero in the initial analysis were set to zero, and the remaining parameters were recalculated on this basis.
26 Table 5A displays the resulting parameter estimates for the vote model. Note that the parameters for partisanship and for each of the four policy dimensions are positive and statistically significant, which supports the conclusion that both policies and party identification influenced the vote. The estimated mixing parameter β=0.66 is statistically different from 0 and 1 at the .01 level, indicating that voters had mixtures of proximity and directional motivations. The parameter estimate β = 0.66 implies that voters prefer candidates whose policy promises are about 50% more extreme than the voter's preferred policy outcomes (relative to the center of the 1-7 scales), so that for instance a voter who selfplaces at 5.0 along the Left-Right scale prefers a candidate located at 5.5, and a voter who self-places at 3.0 prefers a candidate located at 2.5. As discussed above, voters' tastes for candidates who promise policies that are similar to, but more extreme than, the voters' preferred government policy outputs plausibly arises because voters anticipate that the win- 25 For each of the three dimensions other than Left-Right, we replaced respondents' missing candidate placements with the mean placement over all respondents. Because some respondents did not self-place on all four dimensions, the spatial model component of utility for each respondent was computed as the average of the utilities given in equation (5) over the useable dimensions.
26 Note that we do not report estimates of candidate-specific intercepts in Table 5A , because it is not feasible to estimate these parameters while simultaneously estimating the value of the mixing parameter β in equation 5, which specifies the relative contributions of directional versus proximity motivations to voters' evaluations of the candidates' policy positions (see Merrill and Grofman, 1999, Appendix 7.1; Adams, Bishin, and Dow, 2004) . We note, however, that the candidates' expected vote shares, as computed from the parameter estimates reported in Table 3A , closely match the sample vote, thereby suggesting that the intercepts were approximately equal across candidates (see Table 5B below).
ning presidential candidate will face obstacles to fully implementing his policy promises (see also footnote 22).
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The most striking empirical result is the scant effect of voters' sociodemographic characteristics and economic evaluations upon the vote. Of the variables examined (retrospective economic evaluations, income, class, age, and sex), only class, income, and sex were estimated to have statistically significant impacts, and these only with respect to three candidates: class for Chirac (with middle-class respondents most likely to support Chirac), income for Lajoinie (with evaluations declining with income), and sex for Le Pen (with males most likely to support Le Pen). 27 (Note that since each sociodemographic parameter is estimated for only one candidate, we report the parameter estimates in a single column in Table 3A) . A plausible explanation is that sociodemographic variables indirectly effect the vote by influencing respondents' partisanship or their policy preferences, as posited in the 'funnel of causality' developed by the Michigan Model of voter choice (e.g., Campbell et al., 1960) .
28
The candidates' expected aggregate votes for the model are given in Table 5B (row   2) , along with the distribution of the respondents' reported votes (row 1). The candidates' expected votes are calculated by summing the respondents' vote probabilities, so that the expected vote EV(K) for candidate K is given as: 27 The class variable runs from -1 (self-described working class) to +1 (self-described middle class). The income variable runs from 1 (less than 5000 francs per month) to 4 (over 15,000 francs per month). The sex variable is coded 0 for female, 1 for male.
28 Note that given our focus on the electoral effects of candidate policy positioning, it does not matter for our purposes whether this more complex model better captures the voter's decision process. This is because in the simulations reported below, the respondents' attributes --i.e., their policy positions, partisanship, and sociodemographic characteristics --are held constant as the candidates' policies are varied. Hence it does not matter, for our purposes, whether nonpolicy-related factors influence the vote via the partisan component or the sociodemographic component in the vote function; in either case they should have comparable effects upon the respondents' vote probabilities, which is what interest us here.
where P i (K) represents the probability of the ith individual voting for candidate K, and n=748 is the number of respondents included in the statistical analysis. Note that in these and all subsequent calculations, candidates' votes are expressed as percentages of the fivecandidate vote, thereby eliminating from consideration the minor candidates who competed in the first round of voting. The projected aggregate vote is quite similar to the sample vote. Note: The candidates' expected votes are computed using the coefficients reported in Table 5A, using the assumption that each candidate was located at his actual (perceived) position along the Left-Right and policy scales included in the model. alternative Left-Right positions were computed using the estimated parameters for the voting specification reported in Table 5A .
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